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INTENTION AND MORAL ENHANCEMENT
WILLIAM SIMKULET
ABSTRACT
Recently philosophers have proposed a wide variety of interventions referred to as
'moral enhancements'. Some of these interventions are concerned with helping
individuals make more infonned decisions; others, however, are designed to com
pel people to act as the intervener sees fit Somewhere between these flM)
extremes lie interventions designed to direct an agent's attention either towards
moraUy relevant issues-hat-hanging-or away from temptations to do wrong-hat
hiding. I argue that these interventions failto constitute genuine moral enhancement
because, although they may result in more desirable outcomes - more altruism,
more /aw-following, and/or less self-destructive behavior, they ignore a person's
intentions, and often what makes an action right or wrong is the intent behind it.
Keywords
moral enhancement, moral bio enhancement, neuroenhancement, moral compulsion, hat-hanging, hat-hiding,
intention

Sometimes people do the wrong thing. Recently philoso
phers have proposed a variety of interventions designed to
help people avoid doing the wrong thing: some propose cog
nitive enhancement as a means of giving people the tools to
make morally informed choices 1 and others propose forcing
agents to act to bring about their desired outcomes.2
1 F. Jo tterand. 'Vrrtue engineering' and moral agency: Will post humans still
need the virtue.5? AJOB Neuroscience 2011; 2(4): 3 9; J .A. Carter and E.C.
Gordon. On Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Reply to Savulescu and
Persson. Bioethics 2015; 29(3): 153 161; J. Harris(a). Moral Enhancement
and Freedom. Bioethics 2011; 25(2): 102 111; J. Harris(b). 'Ethi� is for Bad
Guys!' Putting the 'Moral' into Moral Enhancement. Bioethics 2013; 27(3):
169 173; J. Harris(c). Moral Progress and Moral Enhancement Bioethics
2013; 27(5): 285 290; J. Harris and J. Savule!eu. A Debate about Moral
Enhancement. Cam Q Healthc Ethics 2015; 24(1): 8 22; 0. Lev. Enhancing
the Capacity for Moral Agency. AJOB Neurosicence 2012; 3(4): 20 22; W
Simkulet. On Moral Enhancement AJOB Neurosci 2012; 3(4): 17 18.
2 D. DeGrazia Moral enhancement, freedom, and \Wt v.e (should) value in
moral behaviour. J Met/ Ethics 2014; 40(6): 361 368; T. Douglas Moral
Enhancement JAppl Philos 200!; 25(3): 228 245; T. Douglas. Moral Enhance
ment via Emotion Modulation: A Reply to Hanis. Bioethics 2013; 27(3): 1ro
168; T. Douglas. Enhancing Moral Conformity and Enhancing Moral Worth.
Neuroethics2014; 7(1): 75 91;T. Douglas TbeHarmsofEnhancementand the
Conclusive Reasons View. Cam Q Healthc Ethics 2015; 24(1): 23 36; 1 Hughes.
Moral Enhancement Requires Multiple Vtrtue.5 Cam Q Healthc Ethics 2015;
24(1): 86 95; J. Savulescu & I. Persson. Moral Enhancement, Freedom, and the
God Machine. Monist 2012; 9 5(3): 399 421; 1 Savule!eu& A. Sandberg. Neuro
enhancement of Love and Maniage: Tbe Chemicals Between Us. Neuroethics
200!; 1(1) 31 44; L Persson and 1 Savule!Cll Tbe Perils of Cognitive Enhance
ment and the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the MoralCharacterofH1UDanity.
JApp Philos 200!; 25(3): 162 177; lR Shoo. Neuroethi� and the possible types
of moral enhancement AJOB Neurosci2012;3(4): 3 15.

Raus et al. call interventions of the first kind 'capacities
oriented'3 and they are consistent with what Harris Wise
man calls a 'strong' conception of moral functioning ,4 while
Raus et al. call interventions of the latter kind 'behavior
oriented', concerned with outcomes and consistent with
what Wiseman calls a 'minimal' conception of moral
functioning.
Each party refers to their proposed interventions as
forms of 'moral enhancement', but in many of these cases
the term is being applied too broadly. It would be absurd
to say that any intervention to a person that results in
desirable outcomes has morally enhanced that person.
Consider the warlord who is on his way to bum down
your village. You might intervene by offering him a regular
bribe should he spare your village, resulting in the desirable
outcome of your village being spared. Suppose the warlord
takes you up on the offer and honors his agreement. Your
village is spared a good outcome but it doesn't make
sense to say that the warlord has been morally enhanced.
Suppose we could obtain the same good outcome by giving
the warlord a drug that made thoughts of sparing your vil
lage appealing, or by implanting a device in his head that
would put him to sleep whenever he though t about your
3

K. Raus, F. Focquaert, M. Schermer, J. Specker, and S. Sterckx. On
defining moral enhancement, a clarificatory taxonomy. Neuroethics
2014; 7(3): 263 273.

4 H. W iseman. Moral Enhancement
Bioeth 2014; 14(4): 48 49.
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village. These interventions, too, result in the same good
outcome, but fail to make the warlord a better person. If
anything, they make him a less successful warlord.
In some cases the interventions proposed by philosophers do not enhance the subjects ability to engage in
moral behavior, but rather circumvent the ability. Consider the God Machine proposed by Julian Savulescu
and Ingmar Persson, a machine that would have the
power to intervene whenever it detected that someone
made a free choice contrary to the ones approved of by
the machine; the machine would then edit the persons
mind so that she was causally determined to act in an
acceptable manner and so that she believed doing do was
her choice to begin with.5 Savulescue and Persson claim
the God Machine is not itself moral enhancement,6 yet
it meets the behavior-oriented account of moral enhancement. Rather than improve the subjects moral character
or motivation, the God Machine circumvents her ability
to make decisions for herself. It has been argued that
interventions like these are not enhancement, but moral
compulsion, forcing others to act as one sees fit.7 Such
compulsion might be acceptable in some situations, -for
example restraining someone to prevent her from harming herself or others - but this doesnt seem like it should
fall under the guise of moral enhancement.
Two other forms of intervention are often proposed as
candidates for moral enhancement: (1) interventions that
prompt agents to pay attention to relevant moral issues,
what I call hat-hanging, and (2) interventions that reduce
the availability of prompts that might lead to immoral
behavior, what I call hat-hiding. Although such interventions may result in desirable outcomes and dont face the
bevy of criticisms that trouble moral compulsion, here I
argue that hat-hanging and hat-hiding are not forms of
moral enhancement. Make no mistake; such interventions are often morally acceptable, but they do not make
their targets better people.
This article is divided into three sections. In the first
section I construct a case of what I call hat-hanging, and
then define hat-hanging and hat-hiding. In the second
section I examine a variety of interventions philosophers
have proposed as forms of moral enhancement that are
cases of hat-hanging or hat-hiding. In the last section I
argue that hat-hanging and hat-hiding fail to constitute
genuine moral enhancement because they do not change
the agents intentions. An agents intentions play a large
part in determining whether her actions are morally right
or wrong independent of the outcomes of these actions,
and thus hat-hanging and hat-hiding do not influence an
agents moral character.
5

Savulescu and Persson, op. cit. note 2.
Ibid.
7
Harris 2011, 2013a, 2013b; Harris and Savulescu 2015; Simkulet 2012,
op. cit. note 1.

HANGING A HAT ON SOMETHING
One night Joness cousin dies tragically, and Jones
believes that the right thing to do is to honor his cousin.
Suppose that he has good reasons to believe that honoring his cousin involves thinking about him often. James
Rachels argues that acting morally is a matter of doing
what one has the best reasons to do;8 as such Jones
ought to think about his cousin often to honor him.
Despite his believing he is morally obligated to think of
his cousin, a week goes by and Jones does not think of
him at all - until he receives a call about his cousins
funeral. Panicked that he is failing his moral obligations,
Jones brainstorms and comes up with a variety of methods to force himself to think of his cousin:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Jones prints off photos of his cousin and hangs
them around his home on his refrigerator, next
to his alarm clock, above his television, etc. Every
morning as he wakes up, gets breakfast, and turns
on the news he is prompted to think of his cousin.
Jones ties a string to his finger. Every time he notices the string, he is prompted to think of the string,
and often tries to remember why he tied it. When
he successfully remembers, he thinks of his cousin.
Jones has a screen implanted in front of his left
eye that routinely displays pictures of his cousin.
Whenever a picture is displayed, he believes that
he will consciously or subconsciously think about
his cousin.
Jones begins writing a novel about his cousins
life. A poor writer, Jones is confident that he will
need to revise the novel often, and each time he
does so he believes hell think of his cousin.

Jones believes these methods will cause him to think of
his cousin, which he believes will satisfy his moral obligation to honor his cousin. Each method seems to satisfy a
behavior-oriented conception of moral enhancement, but
although such interventions might lead to the kind of
behavior Jones wants to engage in, its not clear that
Jones becomes a better person by engaging in them.
These methods are instances of hanging a hat on
something, where an action is hat-hanging if and only if
it (1) draws attention to something and (2) depends on
that something to achieve a goal. When he employs each
of these methods, Jones intervenes in his normal life by
drawing his attention in such a way that he believes will
lead to the desired, morally required outcome: thinking
about his cousin. Furthermore, Jones depends upon
these interventions to bring about this outcome. Jones
doesnt try to think about his cousin on his own, instead

6

8
J. Rachels. 2003. The Elements of Moral Philosophy. 4th edition. New
York: McGraw Hill.
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he relies upon these methods to cause him to think of his
cousin without any further effort on his part.
Jones actions here are not alien; most of us engage in
instances of hat-hanging quite regularly. For example,
many of us set an alarm clock to wake us in the morning
knowing full well that if the alarm clock somehow failed
to ring at the appropriate time, we might fail to wake.
The alarm clocks ringing draws our attention to the
time and prompts us to start our day, and many of us
depend upon it.
While hat-hanging involves drawing our attention to
something, hat-hiding involves (1) drawing attention
away from something and (2) depending on this subverted attention to achieve a goal. Hat-hiding, too, can
result in improved behavior. Someone trying to lose
weight might hide their fatty foods, thinking out of
sight, out of mind. This behavior doesnt make it impossible for the person to eat fatty foods, it just reduces their
opportunities to be tempted, making it less likely they
will eat fatty foods.
Both hat-hanging and hat-hiding involve changing the
number of prompts one has with a goal of leading to
more desirable behavior, but when one engages in these
actions they often rely upon the addition or removal of
prompts to do the moral work and produce the more
desirable outcomes. Neither hat-hanging or hat-hiding
strengthen a persons will do the right thing. The appeal
of such methods is that once they have been set up, they
relieve the agent of having to do anything else. The hathanging or hat-hiding will typically cause them to behave
more desirably without additional effort on their part.
One could argue that some instances of hat-hanging
and hat-hiding are instrumentally valuable insofar as
they train the person to become a better person. For
example, if you set your alarm clock to 6am every day,
eventually you might condition yourself to wake up at
6am without the alarm. However, if your only goal in
setting your alarm is to make sure that you wake up on
time, the conditioning is accidental. The person who
hangs his hat on his alarm to wake himself believes that
if the power goes out, he will not be awoken. If he has
unwittingly conditioned himself to wake at 6am, and
power goes out, he will still wake up on time but this is
a happy accident and unintentional.

INTERVENTIONS
A number of philosophers have proposed interventions
that fall under the category of hat-hanging. Thomas
Douglas contends moral enhancement is any intervention expected to leave the individual with morally better
motives or behavior,9 and proposes the following case
that satisfies the latter part of this description:
9

Douglas 2014, op. cit. note 2.

Bryony is wealthy and believes she ought to do more
to help the poor. Although she occasionally does
something to help, she is generally unsympathetic to
the poor. To help change her behavior, she sets up
her television to display graphic images of the effects
of poverty for brief periods that she does not consciously recognize, but that cause her subliminally to
increase her feelings of sympathy to the poor. These
increased feelings of sympathy prompt her to donate
more money to charity.10
Were told Bryony believes that she ought to do more to
help the poor. She is wealthy and has the means to help
the poor. Yet she fails to do this, seemingly because of a
weakness of will. For Douglas, Bryony doesnt have any
psychological or physical impediments to doing the right
thing; she is not depressed, easily distracted, psychopathic, too physically exhausted to act, etc. Bryony
knows that she has a moral obligation that shes inexplicably unwilling to decide to fulfill on her own, so she
hangs her hat on a plan to circumvent her otherwise normal decision making method, jury-rigging herself into
doing what she, by stipulation, already believes is
morally required of her.
Similarly, Julian Savulescu and John Harris discuss the
possibility of interventions that would raise an agents
empathy11 and John Shook has proposed raising an
agents thoughtfulness about doing moral things and/or
raising a persons sensitivity to the moral features of situations.12 Such interventions are designed to get the
agents to do the right thing solely by drawing their attention to the thing that needs to be done.
Many philosophers also support hat-hiding interventions. A number of philosophers talk about chemical
castration or hormonal castration as a means of preventing future sexual misbehavior by suppressing or
removing a subjects sexual impulses.13
Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson propose a biomedical intervention that could reduce discrimination
based on race.14 They contend that people automatically
and necessarily catalog the race of each person they
encounter, but that if an intervention could suppress this
cataloging, then people would simply not be given the
opportunity to discriminate based on race. Thomas
Douglas imagines a similar case, in which a doctor,
Andrew, who discriminates against his patients based on
race takes steps to treat his patients equally by suppressing the neural connections associated with his racism.15
10

Adapted from Douglas, op. cit. note 2, Harris 2013, op. cit. note 1.
Harris and Savulescu, op. cit. note 1.
12
Shook, op. cit. note 2.
13
Harris and Savulescu, op. cit. note 1, Douglas 2015, Savulescue and
Sandberg, op. cit. note 2.
14
Savulescu and Persson, op. cit., note 2.
15
Ibid.
11
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James Hughes notes that bariatric surgery is the most
effective form of weight control, and that drugs and
devices that suppress appetite might be similarly effective.16 Insofar as we have a moral obligation to stay
healthy, this kind of hat-hiding seems to satisfy behaviororiented accounts of moral enhancement. Thomas
Douglas suggests that moral enhancement might consist
of suppressing counter-moral emotions: emotions that
interfere with moral reasoning, sympathy, and all other
plausible candidates for morally good motives.17 John
Doris suggests that we might modify our social institutions to avoid temptation, thus reducing people acting
on said temptation.18 Similarly Neil Levy advocates combating cognitive biases by implementing social policies to
shape our environments to dampen our cognitive weaknesses and increase our cognitive strengths.19
The key feature of each of these interventions is that
they are designed to bring about desirable outcomes by
either increasing prompts associated with good behavior,
or decreasing prompts associated with bad behavior.
Such interventions might be morally acceptable, but they
dont seem to constitute genuine moral enhancement.
This is to say that the people involved do not become
better people as a result; their flaws persist but are just
less obvious and less impactful.
Bryony suffers from akrasia, or weakness of will; she
believes she has a strong moral obligation to help the
poor and has every opportunity to do so. . . but she simply chooses not to act in the way she believes is right.
She doesnt choose to do more to help the poor. However, she does choose to do something. She takes steps to
make it more likely that she will help the poor in the
future. She is prima facie praiseworthy for taking
the steps that she believes are necessary to get her to do
the right thing, in this case through subliminal conditioning, but this ignores the larger problem. Even after her
intervention, she can still (1) know what the right thing
to do is, and yet (2) not do it.
Similarly, while interventions designed to raise peoples
empathy or thoughtfulness about moral matters may
result in said people acting in more morally desirable
ways, it seems that they, like Bryony, are still akratic
moral agents, unwilling to do the right thing unless they
are constantly reminded. Like Bryony they do not do the
right thing for the right reason; rather they might be
inclined to do the right thing more often because theyre
prompted more often than others.
Cases of hat-hiding further seem to circumvent ones
normal moral decision making method. In fact,
16

Hughes, op. cit. note 2.
Douglas, 2013, op. cit. note 2, p. 161.
18
J.M. Doris. 2002. Lack of character: Personality and Moral Behavior.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
19
N. Levy. Ecological engineering: Reshaping our environments to
achieve our goals. Philosophy & Technology 2012; 25(4): 1 16.
17

advocates of such interventions seem to accept that their
subjects can tell the difference between right and wrong,
but that this alone isnt sufficient to get them to act
rightly. Instead, they seek to remove the agents opportunity to act wrongly. After all, one cant give in to temptation if ones not tempted. Sex offenders are given drugs
to remove or suppress the temptation to sexually assault
others; people who eat too much are given surgery and/
or drugs to control their weight because it is easier and
more effective than relying upon them to fight their cravings; Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson propose drugs
that would suppress an agents ability to recognize the
race of others, lest he be tempted to treat them unequally.
Such interventions wouldnt enhance people morally;
they just reduce bad outcomes and make those agents
less obviously immoral. The chemically castrated sex
offender, by assumption, is willing to sexually assault
others if he feels like it; the person who underwent surgery is willing to eat more if he wasnt full; and the racist
is still willing to let arbitrary traits he recognizes about
others lead to preferential treatment if he takes note of
such a trait. A sufficiently disinterested observer would
be unable to tell the difference between a successfully
medicated sex offender neighbor who refrains from sexually assaulting others and a neighbor that refrains from
sexually assaulting others because she recognizes that
such behavior, while biologically possible for her, would
be morally horrible; despite this it is clear that there is a
substantive moral difference between these neighbors.
Much like shackles, hat-hiding interventions takes away
opportunities an agent has to act immorally, but they
dont make the person better. Such people are still
threats to themselves and/or others given the chance.

NO SHORTCUTS
What is striking about the cases of Jones and Bryony is
that both protagonists take it upon themselves to reject
their normal way of making decisions which, they
believe, have lead them to act immorally. Jones prompts
himself to think of his cousin, while Bryony prompts her
subconscious to think about the poor. Both cases seem
to be instances of what Eddy Nahmias calls bypassing,
the circumventing of normal moral deliberation processes in such a way that he contends would undermine
the agents normal moral responsibility for their
actions.20 Of course in these cases Jones and Bryony are
not merely puppets, but also the puppeteers, so it makes
20
E. Nahmias, 2011. Intuitions about Free Will, Determinism, and
Bypassing. in R. Kane, (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will 2nd Ed.
Oxford University Press: 555 587; E. Nahmias, E. 2014. Is Free Will an
Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the Modern Mind Sciences. In
Moral Psychology, vol. 4, Free Will and Moral Responsibility. W. Sinnott
Armstrong, Cambridge, MA; MIT Press: 1 25.
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sense to say that they are responsible for their free
choices to pursue such interventions, but not what
follows.
Jones and Bryony are uncontroversially morally
responsible for their free choices to engage in hathanging; but is this behavior praiseworthy or blameworthy? If an agent has a moral obligation to perform some
action x and there is some other action y that is necessary, but not sufficient for that agent performing x, then
doing y as a step to perform x is praiseworthy.21 Both
Jones and Bryony use hat-hanging as a step to do the
right thing, but is it a necessary step? I think most of us
would say no, that Jones is free to do what he thinks is
right, to think about his cousin; and that Bryony is free
to do what she thinks is right, act to benefit the poor. If
they are free to do the right thing with no preparations,
then hat-hanging is not necessary to bring about the
desired results. As such, why would Jones and Bryony
choose to jump through hoops to bring it about that
they act morally in the future rather than just freely act
to immediately bring about the same result?
In both cases Jones and Bryony are relying upon hathanging to causally determine them to do the right thing
in the future, rather than freely choosing to do the right
thing at the moment. At the very least this delaying of
right action until the future is prima facie morally wrong.
After all, Bryony could be out there helping the homeless
now rather than MacGyvering her television to program
herself to help the homeless in the future.
Although helping the poor is time-sensitive (better
done sooner than later), Joness moral obligation to
honor his cousin doesnt seem to be. As such, one might
be inclined to say that Joness hat-hanging that causes
him to think about his cousin is morally comparable to
thinking about his cousin immediately. Furthermore, one
could argue that by taking steps to make sure that he
thinks of his cousin in the future, he is actually thinking
about his cousin in the present, living up to his moral
obligations. This, I think, is a mistake; resting upon an
equivocation between (1) the action of thinking about
Joness cousin, and (2) Joness moral obligation to think
about his cousin to honor him. Jones believes that he
ought to think about his cousin with the intent to honor
him, but his hat-hanging only inadvertently involves
thinking about his cousin; he doesnt think about his
cousin to honor him, but rather he incidentally thinks
about his cousin while he sets up prompts to cause him
to think about his cousin in the future. What, then,
about his future cousin-thinking, prompted by the photos he hung around the house, the string on his finger,
the computer screen in his eye, and/or the novel he is
writing? Although hes thinking about his cousin, hes
21
W. Simkulet. On Robust Alternate Possibilities and the Tax Evasion
Case. Southwest Philosophy Review 2015; 31(1), 101 107.

doing so for the wrong reason. Hes not thinking of his
cousin to honor him, hes thinking about his cousin
because he set up a complex series of Rube Goldberg
machines designed to prompt him to think about his
cousin.
The same can be said for Bryony, shes not helping the
poor because she believes she has a moral obligation to
do so, shes helping the poor because she tricked herself
into subconsciously feeling enough sympathy for the
poor to get her to open her checkbook. She might just
as easily trick herself into subconsciously feeling enough
sympathy for unsuccessful, device-affected warlords to
get her to open her checkbook so that they might get the
troublesome devices removed so they can go back to
sacking villages. For Jones, believing that his cousin is
worthy of thinking about is not sufficient to get him to
think about him, and for Bryony knowing that there are
others who are in desperate need of help that she can
provide is not enough to get her to help them. Both have
a conception of what the right thing to do is, yet frustratingly fail to freely choose to do that thing, and instead
freely take a shortcut designed to bring about an outcome that they are said to believe to be desirable. Yet in
doing so, I contend, that they fail to do the right thing,
because the right thing to do in any given situation is to
do the thing you have the best reasons to do for those
reasons.
Consider the following cases:
Hostage 1: Officer John arrives to find a violent,
escaped criminal holding a hostage. He believes the
hostages life is in danger and shoots the criminal to
save the hostage. He succeeds, the criminal dies, and
the hostage is safe.
Hostage 2: Officer Joan arrives to find a violent,
escaped criminal holding a hostage. She believes the
hostages life is in danger. As it so happens, Joan
likes killing people and takes this opportunity to satisfy her bloodlust, knowing that her shooting of the
criminal will appear like normal, responsible police
work. She succeeds, the criminal dies, and the hostage is safe.22
Although both John and Joan act in the same way, they
do so with different intentions. Johns intentions are
prima facie praiseworthy, while Joans intentions are
prima facie blameworthy. John does the right thing for
the right reason, while Joan does the right thing for the
wrong reason. As such, it makes sense to say that Joan
acted immorally.
One might object to this position, contending that all
that matters are the consequences of an action; in both
22

Adapted from W. Simkulet. The Deontic Cycling Problem. Philosoph
ical Analysis 2014; 31: 49 64.
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of the above cases, the hostage is saved, so might we be
inclined to say that both John and Joan have acted
morally? I think not; suppose that both John and Jane
were to accidentally post excepts from their personal
journals online; with Johns saying Today I had to shoot
an escaped criminal to save a hostage. It wasnt fun, but
I had to do it, and Joans saying Today I had the
opportunity to shoot somebody. It was fun, I hope that
more criminals escape and take hostages so that I can
shoot them and get away with it. I suspect many people
would still say Johns shooting was praiseworthy, but few
would say that Joans act was praiseworthy. Can we condemn Joan while still concluding that her action was
morally praiseworthy? Again, I think not. Only moral
agents can be morally responsible; actions themselves are
neither praiseworthy or blameworthy. Of course we can
conclude that Joans action had good consequences and
be happy that she took that action; but certainly we
would much prefer that she was the sort of person who
would act for better reasons. If Joan is the sort of person
who kills when she can get away with it, shes the sort of
person who would kill us if she could get away with it.
As with Joan, it makes sense to say that Jones and
Bryony do the right thing for the wrong reasons. Rather
than do what they recognize is morally right, Jones and
Bryony attempt to bypass their own decision making
processes to bring about the desired consequences.
Observers might think that Bryonys actions are moral in
the same way that the hostage might think Joans actions
were praiseworthy, but this is not the case.
Both Jones and Bryony had better options available.
Instead of hat-hanging, they could have just chosen to
do the right thing. Instead they chose to do the next best
thing, tricking themselves into doing the right thing for
the wrong reasons. This option is probably morally superior to complete inaction, but this freely choosing to do
the second best option still constitutes a moral failing.
Similarly, the other instances of hat-hanging and hathiding discussed in the last section seem to suffer from
the same problem; they result in desirable outcomes with
little to no effort from the subjects involved. Such interventions dont make them better people, they just rob
them of some of their opportunities to act immorally.
They key word here, of course, is some, as the agents
involved are still apt to fail moral challenges. Unfortunately, we are rarely in the position to tell the difference
between someone who is genuinely a good person, and
someone whose machinations have caused her to act in a
way that appears identical to the way a good person
would act.
Moral failing or not, does hat-hanging and/or hat-hiding
constitute genuine moral enhancement? Hat-hanging,
and hat-hiding alike would satisfy behavior-oriented conceptions of moral enhancements, but then again so would
the God machine and implanting the warlord with a chip

that makes him fall asleep when he thinks about sacking
your village. It doesnt make sense to call these interventions moral enhancement.
Only moral agents can be morally responsible, and
they can only be responsible for things inside of their
control. Hat-hanging, hat-hiding, and the like remove an
agents control over what they do, bypassing the normal
free choices that most of us believe are within our control. In light of this, it seems that we should reject the
behavior-oriented account in favor of the capacitiesoriented account. As interventions designed to force an
agent to act as the intervener desires would undermine
agency and responsibility, the only interventions that
could reasonably be called moral enhancement would be
interventions that enhance cognitive capacities in a way
that would allow to them make morally better choices.
For example, education may allow an agent to make
more informed choices, and more informed choices are
more likely to bring about the desired results. An educated moral agent who acts morally will have a greater
chance at bringing about their desired result than an
uneducated moral agent. By stipulation, the educated
and uneducated moral agents who both do what they
have the most reasons to do are morally praiseworthy;
the difference that moral enhancement makes is not in
how praiseworthy they are, but rather in how successful
they are. All else being equal, the educated moral agent
is more likely to bring about his morally desired outcomes than the uneducated moral agent. Both capacitiesoriented and behavior-oriented accounts of moral
enhancement are designed to lead to morally desirable
outcomes; the relevant difference is that while behaviororiented interventions do not concern themselves with
bettering the agent, often merely bypassing the agent,
capacities-oriented interventions do better the agent,
making them more successful moral agents.
Consider two former warlords, the first implanted with
a device that bypasses his free will and compels him to
volunteer his time helping the homeless, and the second
who took to reading philosophy and concluded that he
would be happier, healthier, wealthier, and safer if he
devoted his resources to improving his country rather
than destroying it. Neither raid villages anymore. The
difference, however, is that only the latter acts as a moral
agent. Of course, the latter can still freely choose to go
against his interests and raid villages; but all this is to
say that he still has what George Harris calls the freedom
to fall, or freedom to morally fail.23
In addition to education, it is possible that there are
some biological interventions that may also count as
moral enhancement; for example tools to help an agent
say alert or focused may count as moral enhancement, as
23

Harris 2011, op. cit. note 1, p. 103.
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would interventions designed to improve an agents
memory, cognitive abilities, or senses.

CONCLUSION
Here Ive argued that hat-hanging and hat-hiding do not
constitute genuine moral enhancement, where moral
enhancement is concerned with giving individuals tools
needed to better achieve their goals. The right thing to
do is to do what one has the best reasons to do for those
reasons; moral enhancement is any intervention that
allows an agent to better evaluate reasons, and/or better
achieve their goals. Although hat-hanging and hat-hiding
do not constitute genuine moral enhancement, there are
many situations in which such actions are morally
acceptable, even morally obligatory. After all, it would be
quite absurd to conclude that setting ones alarm clock is
immoral. . . just as it would be quite absurd to conclude
that setting ones alarm clock is moral enhancement and
makes one a better person.
But this is not merely a matter of semantics; acts of
hat-hanging and hat-hiding often bypass an agents normal deliberation process, undermining their moral
responsibility and robbing them of the freedom to choose
how to live their lives. Although individuals such as Jones

and Bryony should have the freedom to freely choose to
undermine their own freedoms, it is prima facie morally
undesirable to rob another of the ability to make their
own free choices. The taking away of an agents free will
is one of the greatest harms that can befall a person
think of the harm done to a prisoner sentenced to life in
prison for a crime she did not commit, or a victim kept
in a medically induced coma by a medically savvy kidnapper (the latter autonomy violation is more severe than the
former, as it robs the agent of more of their autonomy;
although the former comes with additional challenges).
Those who advocate hat-hanging or hat-hiding interventions be performed on others against their will would
have to show two things (1) that the benefits of such
interventions outweigh harm, and (2) that the performing
the interventions do not violate the agents rights.
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